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Few advocates of the
jury system would argue
that the average juror is
as competent a tribunal
as the average judge.
Whatever competence
the jury has is a
function of two of its
attributes:
4

4

ifs number
and its
interaction.
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The fact that a jury must be composed
of at least six people, with different
backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives, provides protection against
decisions based on an idiosyncratic view
of the facts. In addition, the jury must be
chosen in a manner that reflects a
representative cross-section of community opinion. The jury's competence,
unlike that of the judge, rests partly on
its ability to reflect the perspectives,
experiences, and values ~f the ordinary
people in the community -not just the
most common or tmical communitv
perspective, but the whole range of
viewpoints.
Representativenessis important not
only for ensuring "the essential nature of
the jury as a tribunal embodying a broad
democratic idea1,"'but because it affects
the jury's competence directly. Failure to
assure that any given group has a fair
chance of participation "deprives the jury
of a perspective on human events that
mayhave unsuspected importance in
any case that may be presented."'
A jury decision, however, is more
than an average of the verdict preferences of six or twelve citizens who
represent a variety of experiences.
ideally, the knowledge, perspectives,%nd
memories of the individual members are
compared and combined, and individual
errors and biases are discovered and
discarded, so that the final verdict is
forged from a shared understanding of
the case. This understanding is more
complete and more accurate than any of
the separate versions that contributed to
it, or indeed than their average. This
transcendent understanding is the
putative benefit of the deliberation
process.
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If it does nothing else, group deliberation (except in extraordimlily one-sided
cases) forces people to realize that there
are different ways of interpreting the
same facts. W l e this rarely provokes a
prompt revisbn of the* own views, it
necessirily remtmb the jury members
that their perceptions are partly conjecturd -an obvious truth, but one that is
o t ~ udikely
~ c to occur to them.
A judge does not h e this vivid
reminder that alternative consttzlals are
pogfible. A judge, however, has expenon the bench and training in the
litw. Critics of the jury often focus on the
inympetece of people chosen as jurors,
chpared to that of the judge. At best,
he. venire consists of a representatiye
sample of the
- community, with a few
members G h n g genuine expertise, a
large number who are simply average
citizens, and a few others who are
distinctly below average. In practice,
many of the better-educated jurors are
excused from senrice, and others who
show knowledge or ability relevant to the
particular case at trial may be challenged

-

during the voir dire. A t t o w s sometimes
select jurors for i n ~ o m p e tThus,
~:~
some have argued that-theeverage jury is
not only less competent than the average
judge, but is aiso less competent than a
random sample of twelve citizem from
the community.
. Historicaly, the debate over the
competence of juries has been less than
enlightening. In particular, there are two
conspicuous omissions.
First, there is a great reluctance to
define competent d e c i s i o n - h g . Social
scientists who turn to the legal literature
in search of criteria which to evaluate
the jury are likely to fmd it a fnvtmting
experience. It is extremely difficult to,,
design research that will contribute
useful information to the debate on
competence when the concept of competence is not defined.
Second, most of the social science
research and much of the legal debate has
focused primarily on the jury's verdict,
an extremely crude measure of competence, and one that tells us very little
about what juries actually do.
One way to look at jury functioning is
to break down the jury's task into
components, and look at the way the jurydeals with each one. ~ e n n i n ~ t and
on
Hastie4have provided a useful list:
1) The jury members must "encode"
the information they get at trial. A
competent jury must pay attention to the
testimony and remember it.
2) The jury muFt define the legal
categories. A comdetent jury should
defw these categohes as they are
presented in the judges' instructions.
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1. Ellsworth & Getman, "Social Science in Legal
Decision-Malung,"in Low and tht SDcial Sciences
596 (b Lipson Q S. Wheeler eds. 1986).
2. Peten v. KiO: 407 U.S.493,503-04 (1972)
(plurality opinian of ~~, J., joined by
D O U and
~ ~stewarc, u.)
3. see van ~jrke,]ur~%ecrion Proccduns (1977);

3) The jury must select the admissible
evidence and ignore evidence that is
inadmissible.
4) The jury must construct the
sequence of events.
5 ) The jury must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
6) The jury must evaluate the evidence
in relation to the legal categories
provided in the instructions. That is,
certain elements of the story the jury
constructs are particularly important in
determining the appropriate verdict. The
jury must identify these elements and
understand how differences in the
interpretation of the facts translate into
differences in the appropriate verdict
choice.
7) The jury must test its interpretation
of the facts and the implied verdict
choice against the standard of proof:
preponderance of evidence, clear and
convincing evidence, or beyond a
reasonable doubt.
8) The jury must decide on the
verdict.

In discussing my research on jury
deliberations, I present data and some
impressions of how the jury performs
these tasks; I also discuss some other
aspects of jury deliberation.
The research itself involved close
analysis of eighteen mock juries in the
first hour of deliberation. Because of the
small sample size, statistical analysis of
the data generally would be misguided.
The study is most usefully considered as
an intensive case study of the process of
jury deliberation. However, the fact that
here are eighteen cases rather than one
makes it considerably more useful than
the usual case study, because it allows for
some assessment of the variability of
juries exposed to the same stimulus.
A major drawback is that none of the
juries reached a verdict in the hour
allotted to them. Thus, the study is most
useful as an exploration of how juries
structure their task, how well they deal
with the facts and the law, and what
things they discuss. it is very likely that
at some point juries move into an
"endgame" that may differ substantially
from the phases preceding it.

Method

Ideally, the knowledge,
perspectives, and
memories of the
individual members
are compared and
combined, and
individual errors and
biases are discovered
and discarded, so that
the final verdict is
forged from a shared
understanding of
the case.

Two hundred and sixteen adults
eligible for jury service in Santa Clara or
San Mateo County, California, participated in the deliberation study and
provided usable data. Thirty-three of
them were recruited from the venire lists
of the Santa Clara County Superior Court
after completing their terms as jurors.
The remainder had responded to a
classified advertisement in local newspapers asking for volunteers for a study of
"how jurors make decisions," or were
referred by friends aware of or participating in the study. Each subject was paid
ten dollars for participation.
The sample was fairly representative
of the suburban upper-middle-clqss ,
community surrounding Stanford
University, except that males and minorities were underrepresented. The sample
was 93 percent white and 65.3 percent
female. The average age of the subjects
was 43, and 63 percent of the sample was
employed outside the home. The median
edicational level was slightly less than a
college degree. Finally, 46 percent of the
sample had previously performed jury
duty, while 37 percent had actually
served on juries.
Subjects watched a videotape of a
simulated homicide trial that represented
all major aspects of an actual criminal
trial. After hearing the evidence, arguments, and instructions, the jurors gave
an initial verdict. Jurors were then
assigned to twelve-person juries and
allowed to deliberate for one hour.
We chose to use a videotape prepared
by Reid Hastie for use in his research on
jury ~nanimity.~
This tape is representative of the procedures, setting, style, and
issues that commonly occur in actual
homicide trials. The case was complex
enough to afford several plausible
interpretations and verdict preferences.
It resembled most real murder trials in
that there was no question that the
defendant had killed the victim; rather,
the evidence centered on the precise
sequence of events preceding the killing
and on the defendant's state of mind at
the time. Finally, the tape was far more
vivid and realistic than any other simu-

1 lated trial materials we have encountered.
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11 was highly unlikely that we could have
constructed a better tape with our
resources.
Hastie's videotape is a reenactment of
n actual homicide case based on a
omplete transcript of the original trial,
it11 a judge and experienced criminal
torneys playing roles based on the
dge's instructions and lawyers'
nts. We modified the tape in two
the present research. First, we
hortened it slightly by deleting one
efense witness whose testimony added
ittle. Second, we replaced the segment of
the original tape containing the original
instructions, which had been based on
Massachusetts law, with a new sequence
in which the applicable California law
was given. Pretesting indicated that the
tape was regarded as convincing and
realistic.
In the trial videotape, the defendant,
Frank Johnson, is charged with firstdegree murder for the stabbing of Alan
Caldwell outside a neighborhood bar.
The prosecution brings evidence that the
defendant and victim had argued in the
bar earlier that day, and that Caldwell
had threatened the defendant with a
straight razor. Johnson had left after the
argument, but had returned with a friend
that evening. Caldwell later came into the
bar, and he and the defendant went
outside and began to argue loudly. Two
witnesses testify that they saw Johnson
stab down into Caldwell's body. The
victim's razor was subsequently found,
folded, in his left rear pocket.
For the defense, Johnson testifies that
he had returned to the bar that evening
on the invitation of his friend and had
entered only after ascertaining that
Caldweil was not there. Caldwell had
come in later and had asked Johnson to
step outside, presumably for the purpose
of patching up their quarrel. Once
outside, Caldwell had hit him and come
a: him with a razor. Johnson had pulled
out a fishing knife which he often carried
in his pocket and Caldwell had run onto
the knife. In cross-examination, the
defense attorney cast doubt on the ability
of the prosecution's eye witness to see the
scuffle, and showed that medical evidence cannot establish whether the
defendant stabbed down into the victim
or whether the victim ran onto the knife.

Four verdicts are possible in this case,
depending upon the jury's findings of
facts. The defendant may be guilty of
first-degree murder, of second-degree
murder, or of voluntary manslaughter,
or he may be not guilty for reason of selfdefense or accidental homicide.
The study was conducted on weekend
afternoons at Stanford University. Each
subject group consisted of twelve to
thirty-six subjects. Upon arrival, all
subjects were given a brief overview of
the study and asked to fill out an informed consent form and a preliminaiy
questionnaire focusing on demographic
characteristics, general attitudes toward
the death penalty and toward criminal
defendants, and general attitudes with
respect to crime control and due process.
The experimenter then introduced the
videotape and instructed subjects to pay
close attention because afterwards, they
would be asked to deliberate to reach a
verdict based on the facts of the case and
the judge's instructions, just as if they
were actual jurors.

Deliberations
As soon as the videotape was over,
the experimenter asked the subjects to
indicate their verdict preferences on an
initial verdict questionnaire by checking
one of four choices: first-degree murder,
second-degree murder, manslaughter, or
not guilty. After collecting the questionnaires, the experimenter announced
assignments to jury panels and directed
each jury to a separate room for deliberation. These were seminar rooms
equipped with a long table and a video
camera and two ceiling microphones to
record deliberations for later analysis.
The equipment also allowed the experimenters to view the deliberations on a
monitor outside the room, in order to
detect problems that might jeopardize
the validity of the study.
Once the subjects were settled in the
jury room, the experimenter told them
that their next task was to discuss the
case and ti37 to reach a verdict. They were
assured that their immediate
postvideotape verdic: was confidential

and that they need not feel committed to
it. They were also told that most juries
begin by taking a straw vote, and that in
any case they should choose a foreman
before beginning their deliberation.
The experimenter continued as follows:
As you discuss the case, it is
important to put yourselves into the
role of jurors. Imagine that you are a
real jury and that your verdict will
actually determine the fate of the
defendant you saw on the tape. W e
want you to make your decision only
on the basis of svha~you saw- on the
tape. Although the characters in the
trial you saw were actors, we want you
to treat them as if they were real. In
short, we want you to make the
decision you would make if you were a
real jury and if you had seen in court
exactly what you saw on the tape.

The experimenter closed by informing
the subjects that they had one hour in
which to deliberate, and that they should
try to reach a decision in that time,
although quite posslbly one hour would
not be long enough to reach a consensus.
The purpose of this instruction was
simply to assure that the subjects worked
on their deliberation seriously and tried
to reconcile their differences of opinion.
V\7e did not ask them to take a vote at the
end of the hour, and we did not expect
them to reach a verdict.
Subjects were then left to discuss the
case. Although they appeared to be
slightly self-conscious in the presence of
the recording equipment for the first
minute or two, the jurors became highly
involved in tlie discussion and seemed to
forget about the camera as soon as the
deliberations revealed disagreements
4

Pennington & Hast~e.''Juror Decis~onhlak~ng
Models: The General~zationGap," 89
Psyclzoiogicul Bulictin 246,249-55 i1981)
5 . R. Haslie, S.Penrod. hs N.Pennlngton,
Iizside the]u~y (1983).

among the members, which occurred
almost immediately for each jury. After
an hour the experimenter returned,
stopped the deliberation, and handed out
the postexperiment questionnaires.
The videotaped jury deliberations
were transcribed, and the transcripts
were divided into units. In devising the
coding scheme, I identified thirty major
issues in the case. A unit, by definition,
could contain no more than one of these
issues. Short utterances occasionally
contained none; long utterances were
divided into units corresponding to the
number of issues. Each transcript was
coded by one or more of three trained
coders. Coders were gven lists of 100
case facts, 18 major issues, and 60 legal
instructions; at various points, two
coders were asked to code the same jury
in order to calculate inter-coder reliability. Each unit was coded for the general
nature of the statement (issue, fact, law,
vote, procedural comment, and so on),
correctness, pro defense or pro prosecution position, and the particular fact,
issue, or point of law that was mentioned. Coders met weekly with me to
resolve questions and settle differences.

Choosing a foreman
All juries began by choosing a foreman, not surprisingly, since the experimenter had instructed them to do so.
The foreman was always chosen very
quickly, with a minimum of discussion.
The process of foreman selection can
be summed up by the phrase "choose a
man who says he has experience."

6. This gender bias in choice of a foreperson has
changed little over the last forty years. See
Strodtbeck, James, & Hawhns, "Social Status in
Jury Deliberations," 22 Amer. Soc. Rev. 713
(1957). It occurs not only in mock jury research
but in real trials. See Ken, H a m o n & Graves,
"Independence of Multiple Verdicts by Jurors
and Juries,' 12 J. Applied Soc. psycho lo^ 12,
24-25 (1982); Note, "Gender Dynamics and Jury
Deliberations," 96Yale LawJournal 593 (1987).
7. See Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, supra note 5 ;
see also Hawhns, "In~eractionRates of Jurors
Aligned in Factions," 27 Am. Soc. Rev. 689
(1962).
8. See H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Juiy
486 (1966).
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Although 65 percent of the jurors were
female, sixteen of the eighteen foremen
were male.6 On the jury composed of
eleven women and one man, the man
was chosen. When the jurors had arrived
in the room and settled in their seats,
someone would point out that their first
job was to chose a foreman, and then
typically someone would ask, "Has
anybody had any experience with this
sort of thing?" A man would claim
experience, and the other jurors would
agree that he should take the job.
Occasionally two men would claim
experience and a brief "after you,
Alphonse" discussion would ensue until
one of them said, "all right, I'll do it."
These two scenarios account for foreman
selection in ten of the eighteen juries.
Since we knew which of our subjects
had actually served on real juries, we
were able to find out whether the people
chosen as foreman were actually more
likely to have had prior jury experience
than the other jurors. They were not
more experienced: 39 percent of the
foremen had served on juries, as compared with 36 percent of the other jurors,
an insignificant difference. Thus, a
foreman is someone who claims experience, not necessarily someone who has it.
On the remaining eight juries, five
foremen (four male, one female) were
chosen because they were sitting in one
of the seats on the ends of the table, and
three (two male, one female) were
individuals who had opened the discussion by volunteering for the position.
Altogether, nine of the foremen were
sitting at the head of the table, and four
others were sitting in the chair right next
to the head. Table position is by no
means a subtle proxemic cue that exerts
an unconscious influence on the jurors;
in the majority of cases the jurors
explicitly gave table position as their
reason for their choice - "you should do
it, you're sitting in the right place."
These data suggest that jurors give
little consideration to their selection of
foremen. They are generally given no
information on what qualifications to
look for, so they have little to guide them
but their background knowledge and
stereotypes of the jury, gained from the
media and other sources. In the movies,
the foreman sits at the head of the table.

In addition, at the time that the
foreman is chosen, most jurors may still
regard their task as a relatively simple
one, because the extent of disagreement
on the jury has not yet been revealed.
They may not think it makes much
difference who is chosen foreman,
because they see the case as straightforward and do not anticipate serious
disputes. Finally, since no disagreements
have yet been revealed, it is likely that
strong norms of courtesy prevail at the
time that the foreman is selected. Once
someone has been suggested, the others
may think it is impolite to question his or
her ability.

Taking the task seriously
Once the foreman was selected, the
juries took one of two approaches to
their task. One-half of the juries began by
taking a vote, roughly evenly divided
among show-of-hands, secret ballot, and
a go-around procedure in which each
juror states a position and says a little
about his or her reasons for taking that
position. The other half of the juries
began by discussing the facts and issues
in the case. The judge's instructions
contained a caution to the jurors not to
become unduly committed to their
position but to remain open-minded.
A few jurors interpreted these instructions to mean that they should not begin
deliberations with a vote.
Hastie and his colleagues7have
proposed that when a jury postpones a
formal vote, it is freer to raise issues and
discuss them open-mindedly. When a
jury begins by voting, people feel committed to the position they have publicly
expressed, and spend their time defending their position rather than trylng to
understand the facts and the law. Our
data generally support Hastie's findings.
Juries that postponed voting spent more
time talking about the important issues in
the case, and brought out more facts.
One might hypothesize that juries that
voted early would spend more time
discussing the relevant law, because they

would nced to define thc legal verdict
categoriesbefmc they could vote. This,
h ~ w m rwm
, nat the w e . Early versus
late v o a did not predict thc amount of
tifie spat dbcusiing the hw.
Wh&er or not a jury begn by
voting, it ans qic]Itlyappprmt to
members of the jury that they disagreed
about the,appropriau:verdict. 1Zs soon as
these disagreements emerged, the
chakter of the deliberation changed.
During foreman selection there was an
atmosphere of convivality in the jury
room, along with some degree of selfconsciowness. A few jurors joked about
the videotape camera. Once the discussion or an early vote revealed differences
of opinion, there were no more references to the camera and few jokes of any
sort. They kept their attention focused on
the w e .
On the average, 47 percent of their
utterances concerned the facts of the
case; 32 percent addressed the important
contested issues (for example, the
defendant's state of mind, provocation,
angle of the knife thrust, ability of
witnesses to see the crime); 2 1percent
dealt with the law and the judge's
instructions; and 7 percent were-votes or
discussions about calling for a vote.
(A given utterance could involve both a
fact and an issue, or a fact and a point of
law, so the percentages do not add to
100 percent.) These proportions are quite
comparable to those found by Hastie and
colleagues,-whose juries saw the same
case but deliberated to a final verdict.
The criticism that juries approach their
task in a frivolous manner receives no
support from this study or from any
other serious empirical research on
the jury.

Discussing facts and issues
Whether or not the jury began with a
vote, the general progression of the
deliberation moved from an emphasis on
facts toward an emphasis on law. In
juries that did not begin by voting, the
initial discussion resembled a random
walk through the facts and issues. A topic
would be raised, discussed briefly, and
replaced by a totally different topic, with
little attempt to organize the discussion
and no attempt to resolve the issues.

a
When a jury
begns by voting,
people feel
committed to the
position they have
publicly expressed,
and spend their
time defending
their position rather
than trying to
understand the facts
and the law.

mese juri& confanned very closely to
%lve&nnd Zeisel's observation that "the
talk moves in small bursts of coherence,
shifting from topic to topic with mnarkable flexibility. It touches an issue, leaves
it, and returns again." During the hour
of deliberation, the important facts and
issues would come up again and again,
while trivial issues would be dropped,
and new issues added. Typically, as an
issue was examined aPrd re-examined,
there would be movement toward
consensus.For example, one of the most
important pieces of evidence in the trial
was the coroner's statement that he found
the victim's razor folded up in his back
left pocket. Had the victim been coming
at the defendant with the razor, a selfdefense scenario would have been very
plausible. The defendant and his fiend
claimed to have seen the razor drawn;
two other witnesses testified that they &d
not see the razor. Most jpries raised this
issue early and dropped it without fully
considering the implications.
In subsequent discussions, someone
would raise the possibility that the victim
somehow, in a reflex-like action, could
have folded up the razor and pocketed it
after he was stabbed, or that someone
else (the policeman, the ambulance
doctor, or a passer-by) might have picked
it up and put it in the dead man's pocket.
The jury would eventually conclude that
these possibilities were farfetched, and
agree that the victim never pulled the
razor during the fatal confrontation. As a
consequence, some juries would reject
the possibility of self-defense and a few
would turn their attention to the relevant
question of the defendant's possible belief
that the razor was drawn. In general, over
the course of deliberation,jurors appear
to focus more on the important facts and
issues, come to a clearer understanding
of them, and approach consensus on the
facts.
In juries that began with a vote, the
discussion tended to be slightly more
organized. The average distribution of
verdicts prior to deliberation was one for
first-degree murder, two for seconddegree murder, six for manslaughter, and
two for not guilty. Although none of the
juries showed exactly this pattern, most

of them had a majority of votes in the
two mlddle categones w t h outllers [or
not guilty or for both not guilty and firstdegree murder A common tactic was for
the middle jurors to b e g n by asking the
outllers to explaln their demant posltlon,
typically startmg w t h the proponents of
first-degree murder Whether or not the
jury began m t h a vote, however, issues
were ralsed and dropped falrly
unsystematically, then ralsed agam,
slowly, progress was made Llttle by
little, most junes resolved the lssues of
fact and spent a11 lncreaslng proportion
of their clme on the central Issue the
defendant's state of mind

Dealing with the facts
Kalven and Zeisel conclude that "the
jury does by and large understand the
facts and get the case straight." On the
mrhole, the data from this study support
that conclusion. The juries in our study
spent more time discussing the facts of
the case (47 percent of the units included
references to facts brought out in testimony) than anythng else. These were
rarely purely factual statements. Most of
the time facts were raised in connection
with a contested issue, a reference to
common sense or knowledge, a hypothetical scenario, or a reference to the
law.
Most of the juries managed to sort out
the factual issues fairly well during the
process of deliberation. Conflicting
testimony (for example, about the angle
of the knife thrust) was recognized as
such, so that juries ended up correctly
attributing different versions of the story
to different witnesses. Questions regarding the distance and angle of vision of the
various witnesses were generally resolved
correctly, and errors of fact generally
were corrected. None of the juries
maintained an erroneous perception of
an important fact after the hour of
deliberation. Implausible suggestions
generally were discussed and rejected, as
----

9. Id. at 149.
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111 the

case of someone putting the razor
m the mctlm's pocket after he was
stabbed
Jurors tended to focus on testlmony
that favored thelr initial verdlct preferences Testimony about the prevlous
confrontation between the two men was
generally ralsed by jurors who favored a
murder verdlct, whereas testlmony that
the mctlm punched the defendant
~mmedlatelybefore the killlng was
generally raised by jurors who favored
manslaughter or self-defense Thls
tendency is not a weakness, but rather a
beneflt of the dellberatlon process the opportunity it affords for companng
several different interpretations of the
events along w t h the supporting factual
emdence
For most of the junes m this study,
discussion of the facts and issues domlnated the first part of the hour Among
the junes that voted early, there was
usually some dlscusslon of the judge's
instructions m order to amve at the
verdict categones, but the dlscusslon was
generally quite superficial Dunng the
course of the factual dlscusslons, the
central lssues of disagreement emerged,
and jurors attempted to persuade each
other Agreement on the facts, however,
dld not lead to substantial agreement on
the central Issue of the case the
defendant's state of mlnd Jurors tned to
persuade each other that thelr construals
of the facts made sense The dlscusslons
often became heated, few opinions were
changed, and at some point (often, but
not necessanly in connection w t h a
vote), the jurors would turn to the legal
definitions of the verdlct choices for
guldance

Dealing with the law
Juries worked hard to understand the
law. They spent an average of 21 percent
of their time discussing the judge's
instructions. Following the hour of
deliberation, jurors were p e n an
eighteen-question true-false test on
elements of the judge's instn~ctions.On
average, the jurors answered 11.7 of the
questions correctly, a result not significantly different from random guessing.
On a postdeliberation multiple-choice

test of factual Issues, however, jurors
performed qulte well, answering correctly
an average of 8 8 out of 14 questions
(since there were four response altematlves, 3 5 correct answers would be
expected by chance) These results
suggest that the dellberatlon process
works well m correcting errors of fact but
not m correcting errors of law
An examlnatlon of the statements
jurors made about the law dunng the
course of their deliberat~onspromdes
further gloomy detail We coded all
statements jurors made about the law as
correct, mcorrect, or unclear Remarks
were coded as correct even if they were
incomplete For example, the statement
"flrst-degree murder lnvolves premedltatlon" would be scored as correct Statements were scored as incorrect ~f they
were unambiguously wrong, for example,
"second-degree murder lnvolves premedltatlon "
Statements that were coded as unclear
were usually statements about verdlctevldence relationships, for example,
"If Johnson knew that Caldwell would be
there, x's premedltatlon " Whlle thls
statement 1s technically false, because
returning to a bar knowng that one's
enemy IS there does not necessanly Imply
Intent to klll, ~t was scored as unclear,
because the juror could have meant that
Johnson's knowledge was a relevant
conslderatlon m determining premeditation Thus, we did not code statements as
incorrect unless there was no plausibly
correct construal
Given thls rather lenlent coding, we
found that only half of the references to
the law (631) were accurate, even when
credit was given for partial accuracy
We found that 609 were not correct
(28 percent unclear, 21 percent definl~ely
mcorrect) Whereas factual errors tended
to be corrected dunng deliberation,
errors of law were not corrected Considenng instances where the jury changed
~ t posltlon,
s
52 percent of them Involved
replacing an erroneous response w t h a
correct one, and 48 percent involved
replac~nga correct response m t h an
erroneous one

-
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correct in their definitions (sixty-five
correct statements, five incorrect, thirty-

I

incorrect, twenty unclear, four questions,
categories) conveyed an
and tvm error corrections).
of considerable uncertainty
These results suggest that much of the
'Was a . . . I think it was something
out passion?"), and jurors who seemed jurors' discussion of the law on firstdegree murder may have been based on
nfident about the law were often
lieved, whether or not their statements the well-known phrase "premeditation
orresponded to the judge's instructions. and deliberation," and did not benefit
Of the 1,752 units across all juries that from the new infomation provided by
the judge's instructions. In addition, one
eferred to the law, only seventy-five
rcent) were error corrections.

The fact that
"involuntary

,

8

-

.

percent of the 1,285referenqs to the
dict choices addressed the distinctions
tweenathem. Of these, 26 percent were
rrect statements, 11percent were
finitely incorrect, 42 percent were
clear, and 21 percent were questions.
amining each jury's last definition of
e four verdict choices during the course
the hour, we found that no jury was
rrect on all four of them. ~tappears
most jurors failed to absorb a great
y of the judge's instructions and that

earned less than they should have from
e judge's instructions comes from
minating the frequenq with which

leard the case; thus, there is a strong
)ossibility that much of their discussion

since fewer jurors favored first-degree
murder than any other verdict choice.
Likewise, the fami-4iar phrase *heat of a
passionnwas the most commonly
discussed element of manslaughter and
accounted for 125 units, of which a third
were incorrect or unclear statements.
Interestingly, "involuntary manslaughter"
was raised in ninety-three units, of which
fifty-one were clearly incorrect. ~tis not
surprising that most of the references
were incorrect, since the judge had stated
that the verdict category "involuntary
manslaughter" was not relevant to this ..
case. The fact that "involuntary manslaughternwas discussed almost as much
as "heat of passion" in relation to the
manslaughter verdict provides further

Although most of the law discussed by
the jurors involved the substance of the
verdict categories, jurors devoted 7
percent of their discussion of the law to
the reasonable doybt standard, and 10
percent to the judge's instructions about

discussed almost as
much as "heat of
passion"
in relation to the
manslaughter
verdict provides
further evidence that

j

knowledge gained
outside the
do on the judge's
instructions.

A ' . .

.
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the jurors' duties. The juries' understand- Conclusion
preconceptions about the law; the failure
ing of reasonable doubt and how they
to inform jurors that they are allowed to I
In summary, the process of
must rule in the face of reasonable doubt
ask for help with the instructions; and the
deliberation seems to work quite well in
was extremely accurate. Not one person
fact that those who do ask for help are
bringng out the facts and arriving at a
on any jury, however, raised the question
often
disappointed by a simple repetition
consensus about their sequence. Errors
of the definition of reasonable doubt.
of
the
incomprehensible paragraph.
1
are corrected, and irrelevant facts and
Like "premeditated murder," the
Research
on
jurors'
comprehension
of
implausible scenarios are generally
phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" is one
weeded out, at least in deliberations over judge's instructions is increasing, but there
that is likely to be familiar to jurors from
is still very little. We do not even know
this relatively simple homicide. The
prior experience, so we cannot conclude
whether
juries that ask for help with the
juries also do a good job of gradually
that they learned t h s standard from the
instructions
do better than juries that try t i
narrowing down discussion to the
judge's instructions. Attempts to apply the
muddle
through
on their own. Research or
important issues. On the whole,
reasonable doubt standard to the facts of
specific
techniques
for improvingjuror
however, the discussion of the facts does
the case were evenly divided between
comprehension
indicates
that improvenot produce changes in votes, since
correct and incorrectlunclear applications.
ment
is
possible.
At
any
rate,
it seems
jurors' verdict preferences in the case
The reasonable doubt standard was almost
profoundly
unfair
to
criticize
juries
for
were rarely a function of a clear mistake
always raised by jurors who were trying to
failing
to
perform
well
a
task
that,
by
all
on the facts.
persuade a harsher faction to move toward
the
usual
educational
criteria,
has
been
Unfortunately, the jurors' understandtheir position.
stacked against them.
ing of the law was substantially inferior
Procedural instructions were also used to their understanding of the facts and
as arguing tactics. Of the 172 remarks
issues.The judge's instructions were not
made about jurors' duties, 114 were
very effective in educating them in new
devoted to three of the eleven
areas, or even in focusing their attention
instructions given by the judge: that
on the meaning of the familiar terms.
jurors should only be influenced by the
This failure to apply the law correctly was
evidence and law presented in court
by no means a failure to take the law
(forty-nine remarks); that jurors should
seriously. Discussions of the law took up
not speculate about sustained objections
one-fifth of the deliberation time and
(twenty-two); and that jurors should not
were carried out with great intensity,
consider the penalty or consequences of
frequently with an apparent sense of
the verdict (forty-three).
frustration. The jurors understood that a
These comments were also used
key aspect of their task was to interpret
primarily as a weapon to close off lines of the evidence in terms of the appropriate
argument that a juror disagreed with, and legal categories. They struggled to do so,
generally took the form, "We can't
but often failed.
speculate about that," or "We're not
There is no reason to believe that the
allowed to consider that." Jurors applied
Phoebe Ellsworth is the Kirkland
jurors' misunderstanding of the law is a
and Ellis Projessor of Law and
these rules incorrectly thirty-nine times
function of their mental capacities. It seems Professor of Psychology at the
and were clearly incorrect forty-five
more plausible that the system is set up to
University of Michigan. She
times; only fifteen of these forty-five
promote misunderstanding. Factors
currently is conducting research
errors were corrected. A great deal of
on emotions and interpretation of
blockading the serious jury trylng to
social situations across cultures.
concern has been expressed about jurors'
perform its task include: the convoluted,
In addition to several Department
inability to disregard extra-evidentiary
technical language; the dry and abstract
factors; our data suggest that this concern presentation of the law following the vivid, of Psychology courses, she teaches
Psychology of Litigation, Juries,
is appropriate. However, jurors may also
concrete, and often lengthy presentation of and Social Science Research .
use the judge's cautionary instructions to
Methods at the Law School.
evidence; the requirement that jurors
stifle discussion of unpalatable, but
interpret the evidence before they know
clearly relevant, evidence.
what their verdict choices are; the fact that
juries usually do not get copies of the
instructions to take with them into the jury
room; the lack of training in the law for
jurors as part of their jury duty; the general
failure to discover and correct jurors'
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